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Making Rural Services Work for Women and
the Poor: An Institutional Analysis of Five
Districts in Ethiopia
Marc J. Cohent & Mamusha Lemmatt
I. INTRODUCTION
Agriculture dominates economic life in Ethiopia, accounting for eighty-
five percent of employment, eighty percent of exports, and forty-four
percent of the gross domestic product. About forty-five percent of rural
Ethiopians live in poverty, and most farmers cultivate less than one
hectare. Much of the agricultural production is on a subsistence or semi-
subsistence basis.' The quality of public services such as support for
agriculture and education, health care, water, and sanitation in rural areas
is thus a pressing matter.
In most parts of the country, women are intimately involved in all
aspects of agricultural production, marketing, food procurement, and
household nutrition. Nevertheless, the view is widely held that women do
t Senior researcher on humanitarian policy and climate change at Oxfam America in
Washington, DC and an adjunct faculty member in the International Development Program at
the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
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1. See Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, Agriculture and Natural Resources Statistics
Department, http://www.csa.gov.et/Agriculture%/ 20and%0020Natural%20Resources%
20Statistics%20Department.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010); see also CIA World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/1ibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html (last visited
Apr. 5, 2010); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Ethiopia Country
Brief," http://www.fao.org/countries/55528/en/eth/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2010);
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not farm.2 This cultural perception remains strong, even though numerous
agricultural tasks are deemed "women's work," including weeding,
harvesting, preparing storage containers, managing home gardens and
poultry raising, transporting farm inputs to the field, and procuring water
for household use and some on-farm uses)
Since 1991, two major shifts in governance have attempted to improve
the quality of services and the status of women. The government has made
provision of services, such as agricultural extension and drinking water,
the responsibility of district-level governments, bringing it closer to the
people. 4 In addition, a number of laws and policies have attempted to
ensure gender equality. These shifts stemmed in part from the ideology of
the ruling Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF),
which stressed a federalist system of government, and also from the
interest of aid donors in promoting decentralization and gender equality.6
In this Comment, we explore how decentralized rural service delivery
has affected the quantity and quality of services and whether it has led to
more gender equitable service provision. We focus on agricultural
extension and drinking water services, drawing on our 2007-2008 research
in five districts: Ofla in the Tigray Region; Dejen and Sekota in Amhara;
Yaso in Beneshangul-Gumuz; and Ibantu in Oromiya.
In the next Part, we provide some background on politics, public
administration, and gender equality in Ethiopia, both in general and in
relation to rural services. Then, we present our findings on gender equality
and accountability in service provision; we find that accountability tends to
be upward, and that while women are represented in governance
structures and programs at all levels, they are not often in leadership
positions, so representation does not necessarily lead to empowerment. We
also look at the role of representative government institutions in ensuring
access to services. The final Part concludes by noting that service provision
is not as demand-driven as it might be, and that perception biases about
women's roles in agriculture continue to shape their ability to access rural
services.
2. See ETHIOPIAN ECON. Ass'N (EEA)/ETHIOPIAN ECON. POL'Y RES. INSTITUTE (EEPRI),
EVALUATION OF THE ETHIOPIAN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON
THE PARTICIPATORY DEMONSTRATION AND TRAINING EXTENSION SYSTEM (PADETES) 229-231
(2006) (noting that women continue to be marginalized culturally despite filling numerous
and essential roles in the farming process).
3. Id. at 229.
4. See Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher & Kassahun Berhanu, A Literature Review of
Decentralization in Ethiopia, in DECENTRALIZATION IN ETHIOPIA 9-68 (Taye Assefa & Tegegne
Gebre-Egziabher eds., 2007).
5. See, e.g., Women in Ethiopia, National Policy on Ethiopian Women,
http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/fact%/20file/a-z/women-1.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
6. On EPRDF ideology, see SARAH VAUGHAN & KJETIL TRONVOLL, SIDA STUDIES, THE
CULTURE OF POWER IN CONTEMPORARY ETHIOPIAN POLITICAL LIFE (2003). On donor initiatives
on decentralization and gender, see THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GENDER AND GOVERNANCE IN RURAL SERVICES: INSIGHTS FROM INDIA,
GHANA, AND ETHIOPIA (2010).
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II. BACKGROUND ON GOVERNANCE AND GENDER IN ETHIOPIA
A. Political System
Ethiopia is a federal republic, with five administrative tiers: federal,
regional, zonal, district, and kebele, which is a multi-village cluster. At each
level, governance institutions take a parliamentary form, with citizens
electing councils that formally appoint executive and judicial bodies. There
is ostensible multi-party competition, but, in practice, the ruling EPRDF
thoroughly dominates political life and policy-making at all levels.7 Many
civil society organizations, such as associations for women, youth, elders,
and veterans, are basically party "mass organizations." 8 Even farmer
cooperatives, which are supposedly organized to advance farmers'
interests, are usually led by members of EPRDF parties, and frequently are
more responsive to the government and donors than to members.9
B. Two Waves of Decentralization
Since the EPRDF took power in 1991, governance and rural service
provision have undergone two significant waves of decentralization, first
to the regions and then, in 2002, to the districts in the four most populous
regions (home to eighty-six percent of Ethiopians).10 However, districts and
regions remain dependent on the federal government for finances, and this
limits their actual exercise of discretion."
The second wave of decentralization has brought governance closer to
citizens and expanded voice and participation in decision-making. The
7. LOVISE AALEN, CHR. MICHELSEN INSTITUTE, ETHNIC FEDERALISM IN A DOMINANT PARTY
STATE: THE ETHIOPIA EXPERIENCE 1991-2000 (2002), available at
http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/186/1/Report202002-2.pdf; ETHIOPIA SINCE
THE DERG: A DECADE OF DEMOCRATIC PRETENSION AND PERFORMANCE (Siegfried Pausewang
et al. eds., 2002); VAUGHAN & TRONVOLL, supra note 6; Lovise Aalen & Kjetil Tronvoll, The
2008 Ethiopian Local Elections: The Return of Electoral Authoritarianisnm, 108 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 111,
111-115 (2008); Gebre-Egziabher & Berhanu, supra note 4, at 37.
8. VAUGHAN & TRONVOLL, supra note 7, at 16.
9. GIAN NICOLA FRANCESCONI, COOPERATION FOR COMPETITION: LINKING ETHIOPIAN
FARMERS TO MARKETS 21 (2009).
10. WORLD BANK COUNTRY OFFICE, COUNTRY DEPARTMENT 6, AFRICA REGION, ETHIOPIA
WEREDA STUDIES, VOLUME 1: THE MAIN PHASE (2001), available at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/ibrary/5687/Ethipia%2Woredao2OStudies,%/ 20W
B.htm; Gebre-Egziabher & Berhanu, supra note 4, at 25-26; see also C. Dom & M. Mussa,
Review of Implementation of the Decentralization Policy: A Sample Survey in Four Sentinel
Weredas of Tigray Region, Report for the Embassy of Ireland and Regional Government of
Tigray, Oxford, UK (2006) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Dom & Mussa, Tigray study]; C.
Dom & M. Mussa, Review of Implementation of the Decentralisation Policy: A Sample Survey
in Six Weredas of Amhara Region, Report for the Embassy of Sweden and Amhara National
Regional State, Oxford, UK (2006) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Dom & Mussa, Amhara





Cohen and Lemma: Making Rural Services Work for Women and the Poor: An Institutional Analysis of Five Districts in Ethiopia
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
Making Rural Services Work
process has sought to make the district governments nodes in which
bottom-up and top-down planning and accountability meet and are
harmonized. However, the combination of budget ceilings and strong
planning guidance from above tends to trump downward accountability
processes. Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu observe that
the omnipresence of the ruling party and its functionaries in all
spheres and at all levels has made the organs to adhere to its
organizational programs and preferences. In other words, the
Ethiopian decentralization drive is centrally controlled in spite of
the fact that it appears to be a form of political devolution.12
An important aspect of service provision throughout the country is
mobilization of rural citizens to provide unpaid labor on communal assets,
such as soil and water conservation structures, roads, and woodlots. These
labor contributions play an essential role in construction and maintenance
of soil and water conservation works, roads, and drinking water systems,
as well as in reforestation efforts.'3 Too often, participatory rural
development programs involve what we call "stone-carrying
participation."
C. Agricultural Extension
The Ethiopian government officially calls its national development
strategy "Agriculture Development Led Industrialization," meaning that
agriculture is supposed to be the basis for all economic development. The
federal government has sought to disseminate agricultural packages to
farmers. These include fertilizer, improved seeds, credit, and the provision
of extension services. The federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MoARD) sets policy, which is then carried out by regional
and district offices of agriculture. The government is the main provider of
extension services.
Until 2006, each kebele had access to the services of a single extension
agent based in the district, which also has more highly trained specialists
who can provide services as needed. Agricultural extension agents and
technical experts provide advice to farmers on crop technology packages,
animal health, and natural resource management. Since then, the federal
government has required districts in the four largest regions to expand the
extension service dramatically, posting a team of at least three agents in
every kebele. The agents rotate to new communities every few years, and
remain accountable to the district government. They report to supervisors
who are likewise deployed to a kebele and take responsibility for teams in
three-to-four surrounding kebeles. The kebele extension team leader serves as
12. Gebre-Egziabher & Berhanu, supra note 4, at 48-49.
13. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (Dec. 2007, Nov. 2008, & Dec. 2008) (on
file with authors); Dom & Mussa, Amhara Study, supra note 10 at 79-80 (describing the "social
contract" that partners enter into in the Amhara).
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the agriculture portfolio holder in the kebele cabinet. The rapid expansion of
the extension service has increased the number of agents who hold post-
secondary diplomas and has opened up opportunities for women agents.
Previously, women accounted for only twenty-eight percent of agents, and
almost all women engaged in extension focused on "home economics," i.e.,
advice on budgeting, food preparation, and nutrition, rather than
agricultural production and natural resource management.14
Studies of extension in Ethiopia emphasize its top-down approach.1
Agents receive relatively hard quotas for enrolling farmers in technology
packages, and supervisors evaluate their performance against these quotas.
Extension also works through model or "progressive" farmers, who tend to
be better off and male. These farmers are selected based on their success in
agriculture, receive a higher level of extension service, and are expected to
pass on advice to other farmers in their community. Extension
communication is mostly one-way, with agents transferring knowledge to
farmers; there is little effort to marry new agricultural research and
development to farmers' own knowledge, or to learn what kinds of
services farmers would like to receive.16
D. Drinking Water Supply
Only forty-two percent of Ethiopians have access to an improved
source of drinking water, i.e., one that is protected from contamination.17 In
the absence of such access, it is usually women and their children who
walk to the nearest river, lake, or stream to fetch water.
The federal Ministry of Water Resources formulates national policies,
which are then implemented by regions and districts. Until recently,
district drinking water services were the responsibility of a "desk" within
the district agriculture office, i.e., a sub-cabinet agency that had to compete
with others for resources, personnel, and policy attention. Now, districts
have a separate office of water resources to provide drinking water and
hygiene education services.18
District governments' limited capital budgets constrain their ability to
fund construction of new drinking water systems. We found in our
interviews with district officials and kebele residents that this often leads to
a breakdown in communities' trust in the district government, as promised
systems do not get built.19
In contrast to extension agents, drinking water technicians work at
14. EEA/EEPRI, supra note 2, at 234.
15. See id. at 17, 253; MAMUSHA LEMMA & VOLKER HOFFMAN, THE AGRICULTURAL
KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM IN ETHIOPIA: INSIGHT FROM A STUDY IN THE TIGRAY REGION 34 (2007).
16. EEA/EEPRI, supra note 2, at 252-58; LEMMA & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 36; Marlene
Buchy & Felekech Basaznew, The Case of Azoasa Bureau of Agriculture in Southern Etliopia, 9
GENDER, TECH. & DEV. 235, 12-13 (2005).
17. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, ETHIOPIA AT A GLANCE (2009), available at http://
devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth-aag.pdf.
18. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Interviews with Ministry Officials (Nov. 2008
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district capitals, and focus on training kebele residents who serve on local
water committees. These committees are expected to organize users to
operate and maintain systems, carry out health and hygiene education,
establish fee schedules and collection, and hire guards for the security of
the water system. District water office staff focus on more difficult repairs
and access to spare parts. In practice, the district offices often have limited
access to vehicles, do not maintain regular contact with the local
committees, and do not evaluate their performance. Water committees'
training is technically focused, with members expected to figure out
community mobilization, encouraging payment of fees, and promoting
maintenance more or less on their own.20
E. Role of Women in Agriculture
The gender division of agricultural activities has constrained women's
access to extension services. Home gardens and poultry were until recently
considered a part of "home economics," leaving women excluded from
other kinds of extension advice, training, and credit.21
The federal constitution and regional land proclamations guarantee
women equal access to land rights. However, in actual practice, there are
important gender asymmetries in access to land.22 Even where women
formally receive usufruct rights, their land tenure security remains
precarious. 23 Moreover, female household heads who do have secure
access to land frequently lack other productive resources such as labor,
oxen, and credit. As a result, they most frequently sharecrop out their land,
usually from a weak bargaining position, heightening their vulnerability to
food insecurity. 24
1. Strategies to Promote Gender Equality
Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu find that culture and religion
(conservative interpretations of Sunni Islam and Orthodox Christianity, to
which the vast majority of Ethiopians adhere) contribute to women's social
marginalization and limited access to resources, services, and political
power.25 Social norms discourage women from participating in public
20. Id. For more information on local water committees and their relationship to the
district government, see PLAN, A STUDY OF WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION SERVICES IN
SHEBEDINO WEREDA OF SIDAMA ZONE: CASE OF MIDRE-GENET (2006), available at http://plan-
international.org/files/Africa/RESA/ethiopia/shebedinareport.pdf.
21. See EEA/EEPRI, supra note 2, at 235.
22. See Marcel Fafchamps & Agnes R. Quisumbing, Marriage, Bequest, and Assortative
Matching in Rural Ethiopia, 53 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 347, 366-67, 376-77 (2005)
(discussing how gender differences in rights of inheritance obstruct women's access to land).
23. Wibke Crewett et al., Land Tenure in Ethiopia: Continuity and Change, Shifting Rulers, and
the Quest for State Control 18 (Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi), Working Paper
No. 91, 2008), available at http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wp/capriwp91.asp.
24. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (Dec. 2007) (on file with authors); Marc
Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (Nov. 2008) (on file with authors).
25. Gebre-Egziabher & Berhanu, supra note 4, at 49.
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forums, and decentralized governance has not improved the situation.
The federal government has implemented a range of strategies to
promote gender equality. In 1993, it introduced the National Policy on
Women (NPW) 26 and enshrined equality in the 1995 constitution.27 NPW
mandates legal equality and access to services. National Action Plans on
gender, adopted in 2000 and 2006,28 include steps to enhance rural
women's access to and control over land, credit, and extension services.
The government has established "gender machinery" at all levels.
Specifically, there are women's affairs ministries and offices in the
executive branch, while legislative bodies usually have a women's affairs
committee that oversees these agencies. In addition, sectoral ministries and
offices have desks or individual "focal points" focusing on gender issues.29
However, according to Gebre-Egziabher and Berhanu, the gender
machinery and the election of women to office have not challenged
systemic gender bias.30
Buchy and Basaznew found critical shortcomings both in the gender
sensitivity of extension provision, as well as in the way gender and
women's affairs were situated within the agriculture bureaucracy in
Awasa, southern Ethiopia.3 1 The zonal office of agriculture had no gender
policy, guidelines, or procedures.32 Its gender desk was marginalized, had
only female staff, was heavily specialized in home economics and
nutrition, had little capacity for project planning and preparation, and had
no mandate to monitor the office's gender related performance.33
In the Amhara region, Dom and Mussa found that women had little or
no representation on district legislatures' committees on economic affairs,
budget and finance, or legal and administrative affairs.34 However, only
women served on women's affairs committees. The same pattern is
common in the executive arm of district governments, with a single
woman serving in the cabinet as Head of the Office of Women's Affairs.3
Civil society women's associations exist at all administrative levels.
Their role and effectiveness vary by region. While in the Tigray region
women's associations tend to be quite effective, in Amhara, their strength,
effectiveness, and thus, credibility, are constrained by limited resources to
26. See supra, note 5.
27. ETHIOPIAN CONST., art. 35, available at
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Ethiopian Constitution.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2010).
28. ETHIOPIAN MINISTRY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR GENDER
EQUALITY 2006-2010 (2006); GOv'T OF ETHIOPIA, ETHIOPIA NATIONAL ACTION PLAN (Women
Watch 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/country/national/ethiopia.htm.
29. AFRICAN DEV. BANK, ETHIOPIA: MULTI-SECTOR COUNTRY GENDER PROFILE 9 (2004),
available at http://www.afdb.org/en/ documents/project-operations/country-gender-
profiles.
30. Gebre-Egziabher & Berhanu, supra note 4, at 50.
31. Buchy & Basaznew, supra note 16, at 239-242.
32. Id. at 242.
33. Td. at 240-41.
34. Dom & Mussa, Amhara study, supra note 10, at 36.
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initiate activities and provide services to their members.36 The size and
vigor of membership is also likely to be compromised by a perception that,
despite their formally non-governmental status, the associations are an
appendage of the government and EPRDF. 37
While there is a stark discrepancy between formal procedures for local
level development planning under decentralization on the one hand, and
actual processes on the other,38 the participation of women in community
planning and decision making is often negligible. A study of
decentralization and service delivery in four regions found several cultural,
social, and economic barriers to women's ability to attend community
meetings, and to express their priorities and concerns where they did
attend.39 A fear of violent reprisal from husbands, feelings of insecurity
about public speaking, a sense that their opinions would not be listened to,
and time pressures all combined to keep both attendance and expression of
voice low. Yet, perhaps due to donor or higher-tier governments' pressure
to create more gender balance, it was found that women were sometimes
"ordered" to attend local government planning meetings.40
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND GENDER EQUALITY IN SERVICE PROVISION
This Part and Part IV are based on our field research, carried out in
December 2007 and November and December 2008. We conducted key
informant interviews and focus group discussions with local government
officials at the district and kebele level, and with male and female farmers.
In total, we interviewed over one hundred people in our five study
districts.
A. Agricultural extension services
The deployment of extension agents to kebeles does seem to contribute
to making services a bit less top-down. From our discussions with
extension agents, we concluded that they have a good understanding of
local conditions, and often seem to develop good rapport with the farmers
whom they serve. For example, we met a female extension agent who came
from an urban background, but who had adopted the conservative dress of
the Muslim community she served, and who was extremely well-regarded
by local farmers (both men and women). 41
However, it is important to note that the post-secondary extension
36. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (December 2007 & November 2008) (on
file with authors).
37. ANN MUIR, INT'L NGO TRAINING & RES. CTR., BUILDING CAPACITY IN ETHIOPIA TO
STRENGTHEN THE PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS' ASSOCIATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF THE
ORGANIZATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF CITIZENS 28-29 (2004).
38. Dom & Mussa, Anhara Study, supra note 10, at 50-51.
39. WORLD BANK COUNTRY OFFICE, supra note 10, box 7.03.
40. Id.
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training curriculum focuses heavily on technical agricultural topics,
without much attention to gender analysis, community organizing, or
integration of modern agricultural science and traditional knowledge. We
observed that agents learn the latter topics on the job and experientially. At
two sites, agents reported receiving formal in-service training on gender
issues.
In some of our study sites, extension agents complained about lack of
training opportunities and materials, as well as a top-down approach to
supervision, whereby supervisors and technical experts from the district
agriculture office enforce the promotion of packages rather than provide
technical back-up and coaching to frontline agents who respond to farmers'
demands. In one kebele, an extension agent told us that he tried his best to
tailor services to local conditions and demand, but did not receive support
from his superiors to do so. In one site, extension agents said that they are
subject to some level of evaluation by community members and model
farmers. Citizen development teams meet regularly with the kebele cabinet
to discuss extension agents' performance. In general, however, the main
lines of accountability remain upward, because training and promotion
opportunities depend on pleasing supervisors and district government
officials.
Extension agents work with model farmers, who are then supposed to
pass extension messages on to other farmers. Selection of model farmers is
often not based solely on farming skills and social capital, but may include
political considerations or outright cronyism.42 Nevertheless this system
could be effective, particularly if communication is two-way. At the study
sites, however, communication was almost always one-way.
The most common form of extension provision in the districts we
studied is farm visits. One local agent told us that he only visits heads of
household, meaning that he advises female household heads, but not farm
wives, even when providing advice on "women's" activities, such as
poultry raising or home gardening. He depends on husbands to pass his
advice on to their wives.
In the regions that have undergone decentralization to the district
level, many kebeles have three resident extension agents. However, in other
regions, agents remain in district capitals, and more remote kebeles may not
receive any services. We were told that assigned agents often do not make
visits, and some have basically abandoned their positions, although they
continue to collect their salaries.43
Extension in Ethiopia has long focused on male farmers, in keeping
with the cultural perception that "women do not farm." Agents are
evaluated on how many farmers they get to adopt "packages" of crop and
livestock technologies and inputs, and so they prefer to work with the
household decision-maker, who in a husband-wife household is male.Y In
addition, until recently, extension agents were overwhelmingly male, and
42. LEMMA & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 36.
43. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (Dec. 2008) (on file with authors).
44. EAA/EEPRI, supra note 2, at 224-236.
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cultural taboos restrict their interaction with women.45
We found considerable evidence of gender bias in the provision of
extension services in our study districts. In one community, women
complained about lack of access to extension services, although they hear
about extension programs for women on the radio. In another, female
household heads told us that the extension agent only comes by to
mobilize their labor contributions.
Farmers pointed out that the gender of extension agents does not
matter as long as they provide good services. Agents also share this view.
However, there are cultural barriers to male extension agents interacting
with married women on a one-on-one basis. In our study districts, male
extension agents employed different approaches to reaching women
farmers, such as contacting their husbands first, meeting women in groups
(organized, for example, by the local women's association or a female
cabinet member), and addressing women in public meetings. 46
We also found evidence of considerable social distance between
extension agents with post-primary educations and illiterate farmers,
regardless of gender. At one site, a female agent said that farmers should
do what she told them, and was not willing to follow up with farmers who
did not follow her extension advice.47
We found a great deal of resistance to women's empowerment among
male farmers. For example, in one community, female leaders told us that
when women return home from meetings of the local women's association
or the party women's league, their husbands urge them not to pay
attention to the "nonsense" that they heard about gender equality. At two
sites, women leaders told us that men frequently jeer them when they
speak up in public meetings. 48
Recognizing that technology packages may not fit all farmers, MoARD
has developed a broader variety of packages, including a "women's
development package," which emphasizes poultry, small ruminants, and
home gardens. Extension agents and district agricultural officials told us
that agents are expected to move toward advising at least as many women
farmers as men. However, in one study community, the women's affairs
portfolio holder in the kebele cabinet told us that while extension agents will
advise women if asked to do so, they do not tend to approach women on
their own. Moreover, the "women's package" remains relatively fixed,
whereas women in different circumstances have different needs. The same
official said that it is much more difficult for female household heads to
raise chickens, for example, because they spend a great deal of time
providing weeding services to male farmers to earn income. The package
thus might better be dubbed a "married women's development package."
45. Td.; Buchy & Basaznew, supra note 16, at 248.
46. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (Nov. 2008 & Dec 2008) (on file with
authors).
47. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (Dec. 2008) (on file with authors).
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B. Drinking Water Supply
Kebele water committees are comprised of users of a community-based
water facility. They are meant to have direct contact with the rest of the
users of the facility, and to ensure that everyone follows the rules
regarding paying fees, labor contributions for maintenance and small
repairs, etc. However, despite these responsibilities, water committees do
not receive training in community organizing or public speaking and
persuasion, and so often have difficulty convincing their peers as to the
advantages of protected water systems and paying fees to support them.
Local water committees are chosen by the district government, sometimes
with recommendations from the local community. Aside from their
involvement in the formation of water committees, we found that district
governments also undertook efforts to change cultural norms about the
gender distribution of the burden of fetching water. In one district, we
observed posters in government offices exhorting men to share in the
burden of procuring water for their families.
In principle, local water committees are expected to collect fees from
registered users in order to support operations, maintenance, and staffing
(mainly guards to prevent damage and use by unregistered users). Water
committee members at all study sites informed us that community
members object to paying even very minimal fees. In two of our five study
districts, fees generally go uncollected.
Communities are expected to contribute labor toward the construction
of water systems. In one site, the district government also asked for
financial contributions, due to the lack of adequate capital budget
resources. Farmers objected to this demand as unfair, since district officials
had not asked other villages within the kebele to contribute money as well
as labor toward construction of water systems.
We found that the interaction of local water committees with the
communities they serve is highly problematic. In the communities we
visited in Sekota, Yaso, and Ibantu Districts, the water committees were
dysfunctional. They were unable to persuade residents to properly
maintain systems or pay fees. The water systems eventually collapsed, as
did the committees. Water users often simply voted with their feet when
they had grievances over drinking water governance: they continued to
fetch water from traditional sources, even if doing so had negative health
consequences. At these sites, the committees received little support from
the district water offices.
The situation was somewhat better in our site in the Tigray region,
where we observed that there were mechanisms available to users to hold
water committees accountable. The head of the local women's association,
who is also a member of the regional legislature, was very active in raising
questions about water service provision. As is customary in Tigray, water
committees and users frequently engage in the process of criticism and self-
criticism (gimgimma).49 The dialog between the committee and users led to
49. See AALEN, supra note 7, at 34 (discussing the practice of gingimma).
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a sense of community buy-in. But even at this site, there were many
conflicts about water fees and labor and financial contributions.
In most of our study districts, men dominated water committee
leadership positions, although all committees had female members.
Because women are primarily responsible for household water supplies,
female leadership might make it easier to organize and persuade users to
maintain the system and pay fees. Perhaps for this reason, in one district,
women chair local water committees as a matter of regional policy.
IV. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND SERVICE QUALITY
In principle, elected representatives at all levels of government should
help citizens gain access to quality services. But district and kebele
administrations remain heavily dependent on the regional and federal
governments for revenues, so the latter exert tremendous influence over
service provision. While district governments are able to exercise some
discretion over the sectoral and territorial allocation of funds, they cannot
affect the total.50 In all study districts, district finance, planning, and budget
offices play a major role in aggregating sectoral plans and budgets and
taking kebele priorities into account in devising overall district plans and
budgets. In Yaso and Ibantu districts, it was clear that local priorities too
often fell through the cracks in this aggregation process. In one of these, the
scarcity of capital project funds put especially severe constraints on service
provision, and these resulted in great dissatisfaction with the district
government in our study community. In all study districts, recurrent
expenses, mainly in the form of staff salaries and benefits, account for the
vast bulk of expenditures.
Within federal policy parameters, the regional government offers
planning guidance to the districts. In all study districts, officials told us that
on the one hand, this is strictly indicative, but on the other hand, the
regional government evaluates senior district government officials on
whether they meet these targets. In one district, officials complained that
regional targets make no reference to kebele needs and priorities, and that
the region does not provide the budgetary resources necessary to meet
regional targets.
Kebele representatives on district councils can attempt to win additional
resources for their communities.51 However, since budget ceilings are fixed
above the district level, any effort to bolster one's own allocation means a
zero-sum game with neighboring kebeles. District budget officials told us
that they do try to develop spending plans that allocate resources fairly
across kebeles, particularly with regard to scarce capital spending projects.
In one district, officials also said that they regularly lobby the regional
government for additional resources.
In one of our study kebeles, residents complained about the lack of
50. Marc Cohen & Mamusha Lemma, Field Notes (Nov. 2008) (on file with authors).
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services received from the district government. Local representatives on
the district council were not able to get the district government to pay
greater attention to the community. District officials told us that their
hands were tied by regional priority setting and budget limitations, but
kebele leaders and residents said that they saw a breach of social contract.
They pointed out that residents had contributed labor to improve the roads
between the district capital and their community, but still did not receive
requested services.
In our Amhara and Tigray study districts, the district government had
gender focal points within sectoral offices. This provides the district office
of women's affairs with a point of contact and also is supposed to
guarantee that the sectoral office will review budgets, plans, and
operations through a gendered lens. In looking at the implementation of
this system across the study districts, we found considerable variation in its
effectiveness. There seems to be an assumption that gender is a women's
concern. All the staff in sectoral offices assigned to monitor the impact of
plans and budgets on gender were women, in some instances rather junior
staff members (there were male professional staff in some district offices of
women's affairs, however). In one district, we found that sectoral office
gender focal points could not explain their duties. In two districts, the
gender machinery did not exist.
V. CONCLUSION
Even in a one-party system, the authorities will respond to citizens'
grievances when their discontent might threaten the party's hold on
power. The extensive "good governance" reforms following Ethiopia's
disputed 2005 elections illustrate this.52 Efforts to expand representation in
kebele councils, support given to these councils by the district council
speaker's office, and the establishment of additional oversight committees
at the kebele level are all efforts to enhance accountability mechanisms. But
the strong lines of accountability remain those that lead upward. Top-
down modes of decision-making and political reliance on democratic
centralism cause downward accountability to be quite weak. This means
that local demands, desires, and problem definitions are not sufficiently
considered in agriculture and rural development policy making. This raises
questions about both the effectiveness of policy and its responsiveness to
the affected citizens.
These important and powerful forces of upward accountability
determine the nature and quality of service delivery. One has to
acknowledge that upward accountability has some advantages. The fact
that the extension providers in Ethiopia reach a large share of farmers, both
male and female, may be due not only to the favorable extension agent-to-
farmer ratio, but also to the strong discipline among the extension agents
that induces them to meet their package targets, in combination with a
high priority placed by the national political leadership on this service. The
52. Dom & Mussa, Amhara Study, supra note 10, at 38.
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standardized system reduces the challenge of supervising and monitoring
extension agents. But Ethiopian agriculture is characterized by a
pronounced agro-ecological diversity, and one can find different agro-
ecologies within a single district, so technologies do not "travel far."
Hence, standardized packages do not perform very well, and a demand-
driven approach that provides extension agents with adequate discretion is
essential to develop agriculture, beyond other instrumental or intrinsic
reasons to favor participatory approaches to agricultural and rural
development.
A major challenge of providing drinking water is creating awareness
about the advantages of safe drinking water, and encouraging
communities to work collectively and invest time and resources in the
maintenance of drinking water facilities. While this task is less challenging
than providing agricultural extension, it still requires that the facilitators
have discretion, and a top-down approach will not lead to a sense of
community ownership of the water systems. Clean drinking water is not a
political priority, which may well be related to the weak accountability
linkages between the various service provision actors in the system and
users of water systems.
With regard to gender, we found that "perception bias" about the
actual role of women in agriculture remains strong. This can contribute to a
low priority being assigned to providing better services to women. Women
are not considered to be farmers in Ethiopia, in spite of their many farming
tasks. Innovative strategies seem to be needed to address this perception
bias. Also, since the overwhelming majority of the users of water systems
are women, it would make sense to put women in charge of water system
governance as a matter of policy.
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